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The wide gulf between actual and predicted annuity demand has been well documented. However, a
comparable gap exists between the current and ideal annuity market. In a world with costly and limited
annuity products, we investigate what types of new annuity products could improve annuity market
participation and increase individual welfare. We find that participation gains are most likely for new annuity
products that focus on late-life payouts which offer a large price discount relative to their financial market
analogues. For example, the marginal utility from the first dollar allocated to a late-life annuity can be several
times that of an immediate annuity. Our welfare analysis indicates that an individual’s current assets suggest
desirable new annuity products since annuities that lower the cost of the existing consumption plan
necessarily improve welfare. Finally, we consider the implications for annuity demand if new annuity products
ultimately complete the annuity market. Given access to a complete market, we find all individuals only
purchase annuity contracts with a significant time gap between purchase and payout. At a minimum, enough
time must pass between purchase and payout to build up a mortality discount sufficient to overcome the cost
of creating the contract. Since most existing annuity products, such as immediate annuities, do not have this
feature, few current annuity contract configurations are likely to survive significant product innovation. Taken
together, our results indicate that there is ample opportunity for innovation to spur annuity demand and
improve individual welfare.
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Introduction 
In his seminal work, Yaari (1965) considered an investor faced with two distinct 
choices—a financial investment and an annuity investment.  The singular difference 
between the options was that the annuity payouts were contingent on survival.  Yaari 
demonstrated that a rational investor should only purchase annuities. This result followed 
from three fundamental assumptions: (1) an investor’s utility depends only on her 
personal consumption, and in particular, she has no bequest motives, (2) all investments 
are available with and without a survival contingency, and (3) adding a survival 
contingency always lowers an investment’s cost. Moreover, the estimated welfare gain 
from annuity market participation was enormous.  Full annuitization, assuming access to 
actuarially fair annuities, often is estimated as comparable to a 50% increase in wealth 
(Mitchell, et al. 1999; Brown and Warshawsky 2004). In short, economic theory predicts 
widespread annuity market participation resulting in substantial welfare gains, provided 
all financial assets are available in cheaper, annuity versions.  
Unfortunately, neither Yaari’s assumptions nor his predictions reflect the reality 
of the current annuity market.  Consider the assumption that all investments are available 
with and without a survival contingency.  The financial markets offer a staggering variety 
of investments—dozens of commodities, thousands of different stocks, and tens of 
thousands of individual bonds.  Many of these financial investments support derivative 
securities that enable individuals to finely tailor their payouts.  In contrast, the annuity 
market is much more limited.  Even the most basic securities, such as a guaranteed future 
payout, are not available individually—but rather must be purchased as part of a standard 
package of payouts.  In addition to limited options, estimates of annuity market costs fall 
well short of an actuarially fair ideal.  While costs for financial assets are often measured 
in tens of basis points, the cost of adding a survival contingency is typically measured in 
hundreds, or even thousands, of basis points (Warshawsky 1988; Mitchell, et al. 1999).   
Given at least two of Yaari’s fundamental assumptions are violated, it is not too 
surprising that the prediction of full annuitization has not been realized. However, not 
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only do individuals fail to fully annuitize, the vast majority do not participate in the 
annuity market at all.1 Unfortunately, violations of Yaari’s basic assumptions seem likely 
to persist.  The complexity associated with writing and administering a survival 
contingent contract requires some level of additional costs and likely implies only a small 
minority of financial assets will have annuity analogues.  However, while Yaari’s ideal is 
unlikely to be reached, that does not mean annuity markets are necessarily destined to 
languish with low participation rates.  Whenever an insurance company lowers the cost of 
an existing annuity bundle or introduces a new annuity bundle to the marketplace, the 
annuity market moves closer to Yaari’s ideal, resulting in at least the possibility of 
dramatic increases in participation and substantial welfare gains.  However, insurance 
companies are faced with a nearly infinite array of potential new product offerings.  Our 
research objective is to narrow the field of potential annuity market improvements.  In a 
world of costly and limited annuity markets, we use economic theory to identify those 
annuity contracts most likely to result in participation and welfare gains.  In short, we 
explore what makes a better annuity.       
To analyze participation, we argue one must consider an individual whose wealth 
is fully allocated to the financial market and examine the marginal utility gained from 
switching a small amount of wealth to an annuity asset. We demonstrate that this gain is 
maximized for the annuity product that offers the largest percent discount relative to its 
financial asset counterpart.  Since annuity discounts tend to be proportional to mortality, 
insurance companies hoping to improve annuity market participation should focus on 
annuities with late-life, and thus highly discounted, payouts.  For questions of welfare, 
we note that full knowledge of an individual’s utility function is required to precisely 
calculate welfare gains. However, we demonstrate that an individual’s investment 
selection reveals enough about preferences to derive a lower bound on welfare gains. In 
particular, the welfare gain must be at least as large as the discount the annuity innovation 
offers on an existing allocation. Hence, insurance companies should look closely at the 
individual balance sheet when constructing products, since offering survival-contingent 
analogues to large existing asset holdings should create large welfare gains. 
                                                 
1 NAVA (2008) reports aggregate immediate fixed annuity sales of $12.8 billion and aggregate immediate 
variable annuity sales of $0.3 billion in 2005. Given the preponderance of death benefits and premium 
rebates, it is unclear what fraction of these sales represents actual survival-contingent payouts. 
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While our goal is to analyze questions of participation and welfare, our first task 
is to specify a sufficiently robust analytical framework.  To match the reality of 
investment opportunities, we need to introduce both a financial market and an annuity 
market.  While the financial market should be extremely flexible, the annuity market 
formulation should capture both the potential for significant costs and limited availability.  
Further, we need a working definition of an improvement to the annuity market.  It is 
from this set of improvements that we will look to find participation and welfare gains.  
Finally, we will need to identify the (utility) maximization problem we assume 
characterizes individual behavior.  We detail our analytic framework in our first three 
sections and then turn to questions of participation and welfare in the ensuing two 
sections. 
1. Financial and Annuity Markets 
Throughout our analysis, we call all investments without survival contingencies financial 
assets and refer to them collectively as the financial market. Similarly, the investments 
with survival contingencies are called annuity assets and belong to the annuity market. 
For both markets, we assume that an asset’s payouts are easily converted to consumption 
without additional costs, and therefore payouts and consumption are interchangeable. In 
this section, we describe and model the investment options that we analyze. 
A Complete Financial Market 
We assume that the current and all future states of our financial market can be described 
and collected into discrete sets. In particular, we let St equal the set of possible states at 
time t  0. The sets S , S , …0 1  are necessarily mutually disjoint. The current state of the 
world is known, and hence S0 has only one element. On the other hand, for any future 
time t > 0, there will generally be multiple states with known probabilities that sum to 
one. Often, we will work with the union S = S   S   …0 1 , the set of all financial states. 
Since every state is a member of just one set St, we can define a time function t(s) for 
every s  S. For simplicity, we will restrict time to discrete, annual intervals. The states 
describe financial market outcomes, e.g., the cumulative market return equals 80% after 
five years is an element of S5. However, no states are allowed to depend on an investor’s 
survival. 
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Our financial market is complete and defined by a set of Arrow-Debreu 
contingent claims—one for the current state and one for each of the future financial 
states. The state-claim on state s  S pays $1, if and only if, state s occurs. The price of 
the state-claim, the state-price, is given by the function (s) for each state s  S. Given 
access to state claims, an investor can use the financial markets to purchase any tailored 
package of payouts that she desires—a case of maximal flexibility. A useful package of 
state-claims is the risk-free, zero-coupon bond that pays $1 at time t, independent of the 
outcome of the financial market.  We assume there are no additional costs associated with 
purchasing financial market packages, thus the current price Zt of this zero-coupon bond 
is simply: 



tSs
t sZ )()1(    
In particular, the state-claim on the single state at t = 0 costs $1, and so we have Z  = 10 . 
The set of all zero-coupon bond prices describes the financial market’s yield curve. 
An Incomplete Annuity Market with Frictions 
In an ideal world, the annuity market would mirror the flexibility of the financial market.  
A complete annuity market is exactly the same as a complete financial market with one 
exception—the investor must be alive to receive a payout. If we assume that the price for 
the annuity state-claim is actuarially fair, then its price (s) is given by:  
)()()2( )( ss st    
In equation (2), (s) is the price of the corresponding financial state-claim, and t is the 
probability that an investor is alive at time t, given they are alive at t = 0.2  The annuity 
state-claims are only available for the subset  of states for which there is some chance 
that an investor is alive, i.e.,  = {s  S | > 0}t . We call these states the pool set—the 
set of financial states an insurer considers when underwriting contingent claims for a 
                                                 
2 In reality, there are multiple cohorts of individuals, all with different survival probabilities, and all of 
these cohorts comprise the total annuity market. However, since investors are mostly members of a single 
cohort, and can only purchase annuities offered to their cohort, we will simplify our presentation by fixing 
on a single cohort at a time, and one probability of survival. We leave for a future paper some interesting 
cases that are not covered by this simplification, e.g., a couple may want to explore purchasing individual 
annuity products versus a joint annuity product.  
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cohort. For simplicity, we assume that the survival probabilities are strictly decreasin
and satisfy the inequality string: 
g, 
 a 
’s prediction. 
                                                
1 =   >   >  >   >  = 00 1 T T+1 , where T = max {t |
> 0}
t 
 is the cohort’s maximum possible survival time. In this case, the pool set can be 
written as the union  = S     S1 T. Further, since    1t , we see from equation (2) 
that, with actuarially fair pricing, an investor in the annuity market never pays more for
payout than an investor in the financial market, and more likely, pays less. Hence, 
investors with no bequest motives should invest only in annuities—Yaari
The products in actual annuity markets have limited flexibility—an investor 
cannot purchase an arbitrary package of annuity state-claims, but only standard 
packages—the ones offered by the insurance companies. We model an annuity package 
as simply an arbitrary collection of future payouts.  For example, an annuity package 
might pay an amount G(s)  0 in each state s  S.  The actuarially fair price for this 
annuity package G is given by: 



s
G ssG )()()3(   
For comparison, we can construct a comparable package of payouts from the financial 
market.  If we ignore packaging and transaction costs, the financial market price G of a 
package with payout function G is: 



Ss
G ssG )()()4(   
In addition to limited availability, we assume annuity packages carry prices higher 
than their actuarially fair price.  We will model additional costs using the money’s worth 
percentage. Formally, the money’s worth percentage is the ratio of the actuarial fair price 
of an annuity to its actual cost (Mitchell et al. 1999). Informally, a value of one hundred 
percent means an investor is getting her full money’s worth, and any lesser value models 
annuity market frictions.3  For an annuity package with payout function G, its actual 
 
3 There are a variety of annuity market frictions: (1) asymmetric information on unobserved survival 
probabilities lead to adverse selection costs in these markets, (2) insurance companies incur administrative 
and capital costs to create an annuity market, (3) brokerage fees are typically in the range of 3%-10% of the 
contract value, and (4) some states tax annuity premiums, and for these states, the average tax is about 
1.5% of the contract value (Mitchell et al. 1999).  
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p G 
4: 
rice G can be written in terms of its money’s worth KG and its actuarially fair price 
as follows
GGG K/)5(   
Even if annuity markets were complete, survival contingent payouts could still 
entail additional costs.  If we allow for frictions in the pricing of the state-claim annuity 
described in equation (2), its price  (s)s  is given by: 
)(/)()()6( )( s
K
Kss
s
st
ss  


  
The right hand side of equation (6) illustrates the important tension between mortality 
discounts and annuity frictions. When annuity market frictions are non-trivial (K  < 1s ), 
an annuity state-claim may no longer sell at a discount to its financial counterpart. 
discount exists only for the states 
A 
                                                
s for which the money’s worth exceeds the survival 
probability (K  > s t). In fact, investors should clearly avoid purchasing annuities in states 
for which frictions exceed the benefit from pooling mortality risk (K  < s t). Thus, 
frictions in the annuity market have two important implications.  First, full annuitization 
is no longer necessarily optimal—some states are fundamentally better handled by the 
financial markets.  Second, large frictions imply investors should focus their annuity 
purchases on states with relatively high mortality. 
Sample Fixed Annuity Markets 
While our theoretical analysis considers annuity markets with arbitrary packages, we will 
illustrate many of our results by analyzing four fixed annuity markets:  immediate, 
delayed purchase, longevity and zero-coupon. We refer to these as markets for fixed 
annuities because the annuity payouts are deterministic. While all of these annuity 
markets allow for deterministic payouts, the markets are not equal.  In fact, as we will 
detail later, each market in this progression represents an enhancement over the previous 
annuity markets.  
Immediate annuities 
 
4 Equation (5) puts very few restrictions on the annuity market but does implicitly require that annuity 
pricing is scale independent—purchasing two units of a given annuity package costs twice as much.  
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A majority of the research on annuities assumes there is but a single option available—
the immediate annuity.  For an initial premium, an immediate annuity provides equal 
payments that begin immediately and last for life. The price of an immediate annuity I  
is the ratio of its actuarial fair price to its money’s worth parameter KI. The actuarially 
fair price of an immediate annuity that pays $1 annually follows from equation (3) a
equation (1) with 
nd 
G(s)  1. Combining these results and simplifying yields: 
  


Tt
ttII ZKa
0
/1)7(   
As expected, the price of an immediate annuity I is a function of the annuity market 
frictions KI, cohort survival probability t, and the financial term-structure Zt.  
Delayed purchase annuities 
Many researchers have pointed out that investors typically have an option to delay the 
purchase of an immediate annuity; i.e., they can set aside funds now to purchase an 
immediate annuity at a future time.5 We treat an immediate annuity with this delay option 
as a separate class of annuities—delayed purchase annuities. Because insurance company 
policies may restrict sales of immediate annuities to investors below a certain maximum 
age, there is often a time limit on how long an investor can delay a purchase. Further, for 
convenience, we assume that all delays are annual. The price  ()D  of the delayed 
purchase annuity that begins in  years and annually pays $1 is given by the formula: 
     


Tt
ttDD ZKb

  /1/1)()7(  
In equation (7b), the money’s worth KD generally depends on the cohort and the delay , 
but for simplicity we suppress these dependencies. Since the underlying immediate 
annuity is purchased if, and only if, the investor is alive, the survival probabilities in 
equation (7b) must be conditioned on survival to time , and the factor   appears in the 
denominator of the price. Strictly speaking, the delayed payout annuity is a hybrid 
                                                 
5 The following researchers have analyzed the strategy of delaying the purchase of an immediate annuity: 
Kapur and Orszag (1999), Dushi and Webb (2004), Milevsky and Young (2003), Dus, Maurer and Mitchell 
(2005) and Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Dus (2006). The last reference has an excellent summary of this 
literature. 
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asset—it is an annuity provided an investor lives for  or more years, and it pays a death 
benefit equal to its purchase price times the risk-free rate if the investor dies before its 
conversion to an immediate annuity. Thus its payout function has two components—a 
survival-contingent payout and a death benefit payout. In particular, the survival payout 
is G(s) = 1 for all s  S     S T, and zero otherwise. 
Longevity annuities 
The longevity annuity is a recent innovation in the annuity product space.6 MetLife 
introduced the first of these products in September 2004 (MetLife 2004) and other 
insurers have followed suit.7 Simply put, a longevity annuity is an immediate annuity 
whose first few payments are skipped. In principle, payments could commence at any 
future date; however, insurance companies often require payments to begin prior to a set 
maximum age—typically age 85. 
The survival payouts of a longevity annuity that begins its payments in years are 
exactly the same as an immediate annuity whose purchase is delayed by  years, i.e., a 
delayed purchase annuity. However, the longevity annuity has no death benefit; all of its 
payouts are survival contingent. The price  ()L  of the longevity annuity that begins its 
payments in  years and annually pays $1 is given by the formula: 
   


Tt
ttLL ZKc

 /1)()7(  
Equation (7c) is very similar to equation (7b), however, there is no need for the  factor, 
since all survival probabilities are conditioned on survival at t = 0 for which   = 10 .  In 
this sense, a longevity annuity price dominates the analogous delayed purchase annuity 
assuming comparable cost factors. 
Zero-coupon annuities 
Next, we introduce the zero-coupon annuity, a zero-coupon bond with a survival 
contingency. The price  ()Z  of a zero-coupon annuity that pays $1 in 0    T years is: 
                                                 
6 The industry sometimes refers to this type of contract as “longevity insurance.” We have adopted the term 
“longevity annuity” to be somewhat consistent with this nomenclature.  
7 The Hartford Financial Services Group introduced its longevity annuity in March 2006.  
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ZZ KZd /)()7(    
The payout function for this annuity is G(s) = 1 for s  S, and zero otherwise. Though 
this annuity is not available commercially, it is often a useful benchmark since it allows 
for any deterministic payout stream to be survival contingent. 
To analyze our fixed annuity markets, we will need to make some assumptions 
regarding the prevailing money’s worth percentage.  The money’s worth percentage for 
actual annuity products has been estimated to be between 70% and 90% (Mitchell et al. 
1999; Warshawsky 1988; Poterba and Warshawsky 2000).  While our theoretical results 
apply to situations where the money’s worth percentage is arbitrary and could vary 
between products, our examples will assume a single money’s worth percentage applies 
across annuity products.  Thus, our examples will focus on the impact of all annuity 
products becoming more or less expensive.  Interestingly, the results reported in Mitchell 
et al. (1999) and Poterba and Warshawsky (2000) are suggestive of a single money’s 
worth percentage for a given cohort.8  Dushi and Webb (2004) and Purcal and Piggott 
(2008) argue for a single money’s worth percentage and perform their analysis based on 
this assumption. 
2. Annuity Product Enhancements 
In this section, we introduce a method for ranking annuity markets. As we have defined 
it, an annuity market consists of a set of survival-contingent products with known payouts 
and prices. Though some of these products may have a death benefit, we will focus 
entirely on their survival-contingent payouts. Further, we only consider annuity markets 
that are paired with a complete financial market. A financial asset’s payments are not 
survival contingent, but pay either an investor or her heirs. Said another way, a financial 
asset has both a survival-contingent payout and a death benefit of equal value. If we 
ignore death benefits, we can think of financial assets as possibly expensive, but very 
flexible, annuity assets. In fact, investors can purchase any survival-contingent 
consumption stream they desire, provided they can afford it.  
                                                 
8 Using 1995 data, annuitant mortality and a corporate yield curve, Mitchell et al. (1999) report money’s 
worth percentages that range from 84% to 86% for men and women between the ages of 55 and 75.  With 
1998 data, Poterba and Warshawsky (2000) report a range of 82.5% to 86.1%.   
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We say that an annuity market A dominates an annuity market A, if the following 
two conditions are met. First, the minimum price of every survival-contingent payout 
stream purchased using the products in A is never greater than the same stream 
purchased using the products in A. We emphasize that the assets in both annuity markets 
can be freely packaged with assets from the financial market. Second, there is at least one 
stream that is cheaper to purchase in A than it is in A. 
We now formally define annuity market dominance. Let c(s)  0 be any 
consumption stream, and F(c) be the minimum cost of this stream using the products in 
annuity market A and the financial market. If x(s) is the quantity of each state-contingent 
financial security purchased, and y(a) is the quantity of each annuity product purchased, 
then F(c) is the optimal objective value of the following cost minimization problem: 
Aaayd
ssxc
ssGaysxscb
ayssxcFa
Aa
a
Ss Aa
a





 

 
  ,0)()8(
    ,0)()8(
  ),()()()()8(
)()()( min)()8( 
 
In equations (8), a is the price and G (s)  0a  is the survival–contingent payout function 
for the annuity product a  A. Similarly, we let F(c) be the minimum cost function for 
annuity market A. We say that the annuity market A dominates A if (1) F(c)  F(c) for 
all streams c, and (2) F(c) < F(c) for at least one stream c. Condition (1) ensures that all 
consumption streams are no more expensive, and condition (2) requires that at least one 
stream is cheaper.  
We seldom compare two distinct annuity markets, rather, we are more interested 
in the effect new products have on an existing market. If, after adding products to a 
market, the new market A dominates the old market A, we say that the new products 
enhance the old market. Further, since the new market includes all of the old market 
products, we only need to show that condition (2) holds. If a new set of products 
replicates the existing set of products, but with higher money’s worth, then they enhance 
the market. However, increasing money’s worth is not the only way to enhance a market.  
 10
Even an annuity product that sets a new low for money’s worth percentage could enhance 
the market if it covers payouts in states that previously could not be annuitized. 
To illustrate market enhancements, we first consider a market of just financial 
state claims, and introduce immediate annuities. Since the payouts from an immediate 
annuity are constant, this annuity is an enhancement if, and only if, its price I is less 
than the price of a constant payout, risk-free bond ladder; i.e., the money’s worth KI m
exceed the bound: 
ust 



Tt
t
Tt
ttI ZZKa
00
)9(    
We note that the critical value of the money’s worth depends on the cohort’s survival 
probability and the current term structure. Next, we reintroduce immediate annuities, but 
this time we give investors an option to delay their purchases. If we compare the costs of 
a delayed purchase annuity and a bond ladder for a constant payout stream starting in  
years, we find that delayed purchase annuity is an enhancement whenever its money’s 
worth KD satisfies the following inequality: 

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As long as this inequality is satisfied for at least one value of , the option to delay the 
purchase of an immediate annuity enhances the annuity market. For typical values of the 
cohort survival probability and the term structure, the graph of the right side of equation 
(9b) is a U-shaped function of the delay . Hence, even though the current purchase of 
immediate annuity ( = 0) may not enhance the market, the flexibility of delaying its 
purchase ( > 0) may enhance the market. 
Suppose we add longevity annuities to an annuity market of delayed purchase 
annuities. These products will enhance the annuity market if at least one of them is 
cheaper than both a bond ladder and a delayed purchase annuity. In short, the following 
condition must hold for at least one value of : 
 11



  
 Tt
t
Tt
ttDL ZZKKc

  ,max)9(  
Finally, we can add zero-coupon annuities to our market. Since these annuities only have 
financial market analogues, they necessarily enhance the market provided at least one 
offers a cheaper way to purchase a riskless payout.  To be cheaper, the money’s worth for 
a zero-coupon annuity must exceed the survival probability for the given payout horizon.   
3. Utility Maximization 
We model an investor’s preferences with a utility function U(c), whose arguments are the 
state specific levels of consumption c(s). We assume that our investor has no desire to 
leave a legacy—this has two consequences. First, the consumption stream c(s) for U(c) 
only includes the states in the pool set . Second, since all consumption utility is 
survival-contingent, we can ignore any asset’s death-benefit payout. Further, we assume 
that the partial derivative of U with respect to c(s), Us, is continuous and positive—more 
is always better. Also, we require that as c(s) approaches zero, the marginal utility 
becomes unbounded (see Davidoff et al. 2005). This requirement prevents optimal 
solutions with zero-consumption states (i.e., starvation states). Finally, we will assume 
that U(c) is concave for c(s) > 0. 
In spite of all these restrictions, the class of utility functions that we consider is 
quite large. It includes functions based on expected utility, e.g., the expected value of a 
time-separable, power utility function, as well as functions that do not satisfy the axioms 
of expected utility. Further, our class simplifies the task of maximizing utility subject to 
linear constraints (e.g., budget constraints). In our case, the first order conditions, the 
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, are both necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
existence of a global utility maximum with positive consumption (see Luenberger 1995). 
As an example, suppose an investor with an initial budget of W0 invests only in 
financial assets. She can solve the following mathematical program to find her maximum 
utility U and optimal consumption stream c: 
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The decision variable x(s) is the number of state-claims purchased for state s  , and 
since each state-claim pays $1, c(s) = x(s). Equation (10c) is the budget constraint—the 
initial endowment W0 equals the total cost of all state claims. Typically, the total cost 
only needs to be less than the endowment, however, since the marginal utilities are all 
positive, the full endowment will be spent. The first order conditions for this problem 
simplify to: 
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Here, the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint,   > 0 , measures the marginal 
utility with respect to the initial endowment W0. 
More generally, an investor with access to annuity products will solve the 
following program: 
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In equations (12), the decision variable x(s) is the number of financial state-claims 
purchased for the state s  , and the variable y(a) is the number of shares of the annuity 
product a  A. The survival-contingent consumption c(s) is the sum of the payouts from 
the state-claims x(s) and all annuities—the contribution from the annuity a is y(a) G (s)a . 
Since no future trading is allowed, the current choices for x and y determine all current 
and future consumption c. Equation (12c) is the budget constraint; the full endowment 
W0 is used to purchase assets. Equations (12d) and (12e) are no-short sale constraints f
financial assets and annuity products, respectively. Allowing short positions in annuity 
or 
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products is problematic due to the ability to fund arbitrary current consumption by 
issuing future survival-contingent liabilities. However, short positions in financial assets 
are often reasonable, e.g., if the present value of all financial assets is always non-
negative, then short positions have collateral if the investor dies. Still, we opt for the 
more restrictive, but simpler, no short sale condition. In the Appendix, we identify and 
solve the first-order conditions for the mathematical program described by equations 
(12). The solution prescribes the number of shares of financial assets x and annuity 
assets y that an investor should purchase to maximize her utility. Generally, the optimal 
utility U and consumption c will depend on which products are available in her annuity 
market.  
4. Annuity Market Participation 
The original annuity puzzle centered on Yaari’s prediction that a rational investor without 
a bequest motive would only purchase annuity assets. Since the potential benefits are 
large, why do so few investors actually adopt the strategy? Some economists argue that 
actual benefits have been overestimated, while others argue that actual costs have been 
underestimated. Still, both camps consistently conclude that individuals should invest a 
significant portion of their wealth in annuities (Brown and Warshawsky 2004; Davidoff 
et al. 2005). Since Yaari’s analysis, the puzzle has evolved—economic theory predicts 
almost everyone should participate somewhat in the annuity market, but surprisingly, 
virtually no one does. Davidoff et al. suggested that the reasons are behavioral, and 
Brown et al. (2008) and Hu and Scott (2007) have investigated this hypothesis. In this 
section, we focus on what drives annuity market participation and which products would 
increase it. We examine the predictions for both rational investors and for investors with 
a behavioral bias against annuity purchases.   
Participation for Rational Investors 
Fundamentally, annuity assets are purchased because they offer a discount on 
consumption. For our analysis, we measure this discount as the spending-improvement 
quotient q identified in Scott [2008].  The q for a particular annuity asset is defined as: 
  )()()()()13( aGaGaGaqa    
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The spending-improvement quotient reflects the savings (or additional spending) one 
could achieve by replicating the payouts of a financial asset with a dollar invested in an 
annuity asset.  We define an annuity market’s spending-improvement quotient Q as the 
maximum q available across all annuity products:   
)(max)13( aqQb
Aa
  
An annuity market participant is any investor who owns an annuity asset, whereas 
non-participants own only financial assets.  To analyze the participation decision, we 
must investigate an investor’s marginal utility as a function of her wealth  allocated to 
annuities: 
a
Aa
ayc  

)()13(   
A non-participant’s investments are all in the financial market, and so  = 0. We can 
identify participants in the annuity market by first assuming they only have access to the 
financial market, and then assessing the marginal utility associated with the first dollar 
annuitized.  Participants will find they get positive marginal utility from the first dollar 
annuitized.  The marginal utility for initially swapping money out of financial assets and 
into annuity assets is given by (see Appendix for details): 
,)13( *0* QddUd     
where  is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint that appears in equation 
(10c).  Since  is strictly positive from our assumption that more consumption is 
preferred to less, equation (13d) implies that investors participate in the annuity market 
whenever Q > 0, or equivalently, whenever at least one annuity product is offered at a 
discount,   < G G. Moreover, we see that marginal utility from participation is 
proportional to the annuity market’s spending-improvement quotient Q. Surprisingly, all 
investors of a given cohort agree on which annuity product delivers the maximum 
marginal benefit from participation, even though they will likely disagree on the 
magnitude of the benefit, since the latter depends on an investor’s utility function via the 
multiplier . 
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Given equation (13d), it is not surprising that previous research consistently finds 
at least partial allocations to the annuity market uniformly optimal.  Even though we 
allow for flexible annuity bundles and a general utility function, we find participation is 
unanimous provided at least one annuity product is offered at a discount.  For our rational 
investor, the only explanation for a dearth of participation is if the market Q is negative.  
In other words, if annuitization costs are high enough to overwhelm the mortality 
discount for all available annuity products then no rational investor should participate.   
To assess costs as an explanation for participation, we analyze our fixed annuity 
markets as viewed by a cohort of women aged 65.9  For example, consider an immediate 
annuity with $1 payouts that begin at age 65.  Assuming actuarially fair pricing, the price 
for this annuity is $17.96.  Purchasing the same payout stream in the financial market 
costs $26.00.  However, if instead of actuarially fair pricing, this immediate annuity is 
priced assuming a money’s worth value of 69%, then the annuity and the financial price 
for this payout stream would be equal.  A money’s worth higher than 69% implies the 
immediate annuity offers a discount on consumption, and any value below 69% indicates 
the annuity is inferior to the pricing in the financial market.  At this breakeven level of 
costs, q takes on a value of zero.  Since the reported range for money’s worth percentages 
is 70% to 90%, perhaps costs are a key driver explaining the dearth of annuitization.  
However, equation (13d) requires all annuities have inferior pricing if we are to explain 
an absence of participation.   
                                                 
9 All survival probabilities are calculated using the GAM94 mortality table adjusted to 2006.  The term 
structure of interest rates is assumed to be a flat 2%.  
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Figure 1 reports the breakeven money’s worth percentages for a range of fixed 
annuity products. The horizontal axis in Figure 1 identifies the age of the first survival 
contingent payout for the given annuity package.  The vertical axis corresponds to the 
“breakeven” money’s worth value that equates the annuity and financial market costs for 
the given payout bundle.  For example, an immediate annuity, a delayed purchase annuity 
and a longevity annuity are equivalent assuming their respective payouts all begin at age 
65.  As illustrated in Figure 1, the breakeven money’s worth for this annuity bundle is 
69%.  Data for delayed purchase and longevity annuities are included out to age 85 since 
this corresponds to the latest age a typical policy allows one to start payments.   
Breakeven values for delayed purchase annuities decline from 69% at age 65 to 
55% at age 85.  Thus, in a high cost environment, it could be optimal to delay the 
purchase of an immediate annuity.  For costs to preclude the use of delayed purchase 
annuities, money’s worth percentages would have to drop below 55%, a value lower than 
any reported in the literature.  Longevity annuities also exhibit declining breakeven 
money’s worth values as the payout age increases.  Since longevity annuities price 
dominate delayed purchase annuities, their breakeven money’s worth percentages are 
lower.  By age 85, the breakeven money’s worth for a longevity annuity is 35%.  In other 
words, with a longevity annuity, insurance companies must charge a price roughly triple 
the actuarially fair price to eliminate the discount.   
 17
Given our model, a cohort of rational investors uniformly decides whether or not 
to participate based on the sign of Q.  A negative Q is possible given sufficiently high 
fees.  If writing annuity contracts involve high costs which necessitate high fees, then 
insurance companies should introduce annuities with payouts concentrated in low 
survival states.  This class of annuity packages would allow both a high insurance fee 
while still providing a discount relative to the financial market.  By separating the 
purchase date from the payout date for all payouts, longevity annuities significantly lower 
the survival probability for each payout.  The result is a contract that offers a discount 
even in extremely high cost environments.  If costs were the main barrier to demand, the 
introduction of longevity annuities should significantly increase participation.  However, 
since delayed purchase annuities also have a relatively low breakeven and have been 
readily available for years, costs alone seem insufficient to explain the dearth in 
participation.    
Participation for Investors with a Behavioral Bias     
If costs considerations are insufficient to preclude annuitization, perhaps some other 
factor is involved.  In this section, we consider a simple model for investors with a 
behavioral bias against purchasing annuities. We assume that their utility functions have 
one additional argument—the amount of wealth invested in annuities  given by equation 
(13c).  In particular, we let V(c, ) represent the utility function of our behavioral 
investor.  Further, we assume that any increase in  decreases utility, i.e.,  V/  < 0. To 
identify an annuity market participant, we first constrain an individual to only use the 
financial markets, and then evaluate the marginal utility of the first dollar annuitized.  
Annuity market participants will find their initial allocation to the annuity market 
generates positive marginal utility.  As we demonstrate in the Appendix, the marginal 
utility from initial participation is given by: 
 
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The annuity penalty P is dimensionless, positive, and depends on an investor’s utility 
function, i.e., it varies within a cohort. We see from equation (14a) that an individual will 
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increase her utility and purchase annuities provided the market’s Q exceeds her value of 
P. While no member of a behavioral cohort will participate unless Q exceeds the cohort’s 
minimum P, all members will participate if Q exceeds its maximum P. However, it is 
more likely that some members will participate, and the remaining will not. In short, 
participation now depends on the magnitude of Q rather than just its sign.   
Money's Worth (K) Immediate Delayed Purchase Longevity
100% 0.45 0.82 1.86
90% 0.30 0.63 1.57
80% 0.16 0.45 1.29
70% 0.01 0.27 1.00
Table 1
Annuity Market Q  
Notes :  Interest rates are 2%.  Survival probabilities based on age 65 female using GAM 94 mortality tables with adjustments to 2006.  The 
maximum age is assumed to be 100.  Delayed purchase and longevity annuities have a maximum payout start age of 85.  
Table 1 reports the magnitude of Q for various combinations of fixed annuity 
markets and money’s worth percentages.  For example, an actuarially fair immediate 
annuity has a q-value of q = ($26.00 - $17.96) / $17.96 = 0.45.  If this is the only annuity 
available, then this is also the market Q as reported in Table 1.  Now, suppose our cohort 
can also purchase an actuarially fair longevity annuity with $1 payments that begin at age 
85 at a price of $3.26. The cost of this annuity’s replicating bond ladder is $9.32, and so q 
= ($9.32 - $3.26) / $3.26 = 1.86. If age 85 is the maximum age payouts can begin, then 
this will also be the annuity market Q. 
Assuming a money’s worth value of 80%, then historically light participation in 
the delayed purchase annuity market suggests that most investors have a value of P that 
exceeds this market’s Q, a value of 0.45 (see Table 1). In other words, the behavioral 
disutility of annuitizing the first dollar exceeds 0.45 times the utility gained from a dollar 
increase in initial wealth endowment. For the same money’s worth of 80%, a smaller 
behavioral distortion can explain the unpopularity of immediate annuities purchased at 
age 65: the disutility of annuitizing only needs to exceed 0.16 times the marginal utility 
of wealth. While introducing new annuities does not affect an individual’s P, the 
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marginal utility of participation can increase if the introduction increases the market Q.  
The introduction of longevity annuities nearly tripled the market’s Q to 1.29.  If this 
simple behavioral model is correct, then we should see a boost in participation. The 
disutility of annuitizing would have to exceed the marginal utility of wealth to suppress 
participation in this market.  Moreover, underwriters could increase participation further 
by introducing new products that increase the market’s Q.  
While Yaari predicted individuals would spend every last dollar on annuities, 
participation merely requires some annuity allocation.  Surprisingly, we find that the 
marginal utility from participation is governed for everyone by the same quantity, the 
market spending improvement quotient Q.  This suggests that insurance companies 
looking to improve participation with new annuity products should focus on increasing 
Q.  These new products are not necessarily low-cost, high money’s worth products.  
Indeed, a high Q is most easily attained by offering annuity products with payout bundles 
focused on high mortality states.  Even a relatively high cost longevity annuity market, 
with a money’s worth value of 70%, offers double the Q compared to an actuarially fair 
immediate annuity.   
5. Individual Welfare  
Whereas our analysis of the participation decision focused on the marginal utility from an 
initial allocation to annuities, in this section we investigate the total welfare an investor 
gains from access to an annuity market and which market enhancements potentially 
provide the largest gains. We first introduce an investor’s expenditure function E(U )0 , the 
minimum cost to achieve the utility level U0 using the annuity and financial markets: 
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For example, consider an investor with an initial endowment W0 and investments in the 
annuity market A. Her maximum utility U is the solution to the program given by 
equations (12), and the value of her expenditure function for this level is E(U ) = W 0. 
Suppose an investor chooses products from an annuity market A that enhances the 
market A. We expect that she may pay less, but never more, and still achieve the same 
level of utility. The money she saves is her welfare gain. Formally, if we let E and E be 
the expenditure functions for the annuity markets A and A, respectively, then the welfare 
gain W is defined as: 
)()()(  )16( *0** UEWUEUEW    
Informally, an investor’s welfare gain is the money she can save by using the products in 
the enhanced annuity market and still maintain her original level of utility. Given an 
investor’s utility function, we can easily calculate welfare gains.  
Portfolio Decisions and Welfare Bounds 
Unfortunately, an individual’s utility function is not directly observable.  Utility functions 
are individual specific, and while our examples can illustrate effects, welfare calculations 
based on a particular utility function have limited practical application. In the following, 
we get around this difficulty by recasting the problem in terms of an investor’s observed 
actions (she makes investments to support her future spending) and away from her 
unobserved decision process (she maximizes her personal utility function). Our method 
produces some very general results about how annuity enhancements influence welfare. 
Our first step is to rewrite welfare as a function of consumption. If c is the 
optimal consumption computed from minimizing expenses in annuity market A, then 
E(U ) = F(c )  , where F is the consumption based cost function defined by equations (8). 
Similarly, for the annuity market enhancement A, we have the optimal consumption c   
and expenditure E(U ) = F(c )  . Hence, using these equalities and equation (16), we can 
rewrite welfare in terms of the optimal consumptions as follows: 
   )()()()()()()17( ****** cFcFcFcFcFcFW   
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The second equality in equation (17) splits the welfare gain into two components. The 
first term in brackets is the money saved by purchasing the original consumption in the 
enhanced market. We call this the welfare from savings, and since we assume that A 
enhances A, it is always non-negative. The second term in brackets is the welfare from 
shifting consumption streams. Both c and c   have the same utility U, however, in the 
enhanced market A, the latter is optimal and will never be more expensive than the 
former.10 The second term is called the welfare from consumption shifting, and it is also 
non-negative. Since both terms are non-negative, there is never a welfare loss if an 
annuity market A enhances a market A. 
Equation (17) relates welfare to consumption—it depends on both the current 
market consumption c and the hypothetical, enhanced market consumption c  . 
However, at the cost of some precision, we can eliminate the latter dependence. Since, 
the welfare from shifting is non-negative, a lower bound on total welfare is just the 
welfare from savings, which depends only on the current consumption c. Hence, we 
have: 
n 
mption 
r 
or 
 vanishes and the total welfare gained is 
approximately the welfare from savings: 
                                                
)()()18( ** cFcFW   
The sharpness of this welfare bound depends on the size of the welfare from shifting.  I
general, welfare from shifting depends on the degree to which prices for consu
change and the substitutability of the arguments of the utility function.  Since 
consumption across states is generally modeled with a low degree of substitutability—
gorging one year does not make up for starvation the next—the welfare from shifting 
tends to be small resulting in a sharp bound on the welfare gain.  We can make a stronge
argument for the quality of this bound in the limit as price changes become small.  F
small price changes, welfare from shifting
)()()19( ** cFcFW   
 
(c*) - F'(c'*)] ≥ 0.  
10 We can easily show that the consumption shift welfare is non-negative. First, the consumption streams 
c'* and c* have the same utility U*. The cost of c'* is F'(c'*) = E'(U*), but this is the least cost way of 
getting the utility level U*. Thus, any other consumption stream with the same utility is at least as 
expensive, and in particular, we have F'(c*) ≥ F'(c'*), or [F'
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In this context, a price change refers to the price differential between an annuity product 
in the enhanced market and the minimum cost replicating package of financial and 
annuity products in the original annuity market.11 
Generally, the bound described by equation (18) requires full knowledge of the 
optimal consumption bundle c; however, we can obtain a weaker bound using partial 
consumption information. First, consider the investment shares x   and y   that are 
purchased to form the least cost portfolio for c. These shares can be arbitrarily parceled 
out to multiple, virtual accounts. We call these virtual accounts partial portfolios, and we 
call their payouts partial consumption streams. If we create M partial portfolios, there 
will be M partial consumptions 1, 2, …, M, and their sum will equal or exceed c. 
Partial consumption streams have the property that the sum of the welfare savings from 
each stream is a bound on the welfare savings of their sum, the total consumption.12 
Using this property, we get the following weaker bound on welfare: 
                                                 
11 Consider a simplified situation where two annuity markets, A and A', offer the same products.  Annuity 
market A' is considered an enhancement because it has lower prices. Let p and p' be the price vectors in A 
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(c) - F(c) = F(1+ 2) - F(1+ 2)  [F(1) + F(2)] - [F(1) + F(2)] = [F(1) - F(1) ] + [F(2) - 
and A', respectively. The welfare gain for a fixed utility level U0 is W = e(p,U0) – e(p',U0), where e is the
expenditure function. For small price changes, we can approximate the welfare gain with its differential: 
W  dW =  (pa- p'a) e(p,U0)/pa. However, from the Envelope Theorem, we have ya =e(p,U0)/pa, 
where ya is the number of product shares purchased in market A for utility level U0. Hence, W   (pa  
ya) -  (p'a  ya) = F(c) - F'(c), where c is the consumption generated by the portfolio, and F is the cost 
function. 
Surprisingly, we can extend this result to any annuity market A and its enhancement A'.  To see this, 
recognize that we can repackage linear combinations of existing products in A to create new products
without altering the expenditure function.  In particular, in A we can replicate, at minimum cost, the 
payouts of any product in A.  We let market B correspond to the union of A and all replicated produc
A'.  Note that B simply offers some redundant packages, but does not offer any economic advantage 
relative to A.  We can similarly construct B' as the union of A' and least cost linear combinations of 
products in A' that replicate the products in A.  Since economic opportunities are unchanged, welfare
gained from B to B' is equivalent to welfare gained from A to A'.  However, B and B' offer the same se
products only at different prices, demonstrating that the approximation holds in general.     
12 For annuity market A, suppose we split a minimum cost portfolio for the consumption stream
partial portfolios with partial consumption streams 1 and 2. We can show from equations (12) and the 
definition of partial portfolios that F(1+ 2) = F(1) + F(2). In fact, the purpose of partial portfolios is t
obtain this equality. Generally, the relation is an inequality, and this is also true for partial consumptions 
when the costs are computed with a different annuity market, say A, i.e., F(1+ 2)  F(1) + F(2). 
From these two properties we get the bound: 
 
F
F(2)]. 
 
This result generalizes for any finite number of partial portfolios and consumptions. 
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Each partial portfolio’s contribution to the above bound is its welfare from savings and i
non-negative. Hence, if any one of the partial consumption streams is unknown, its term 
can be bounded by zero and dropped from the sum.  Given equation (20), we no longer 
need full knowledge of an individual’s portfolio to calculate a bound of welfare gained.  
Instead, if we can identify any part of an individual’s investment portfolio, we can bound 
the welfare based on the savings the enhanced annuity market offers on replicating
partial portfolio
s 
 that 
.  Of course, as our knowledge of the partial portfolio becomes more and 
more com
rtant 
s 
an 
 real 
as 
 risk free 
 
fraction of m
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plete, the welfare bound from equation (20) approaches the bound from 
equation (18). 
The welfare bounds identified in equation (18) and equation (20) have impo
implications for annuity product introductions. Since welfare gains are primarily saving
gains, annuity providers can use a cohort’s representative portfolios to design new 
products. Rather than designing products based on individual utility, underwriters c
focus on products that match the payouts of currently held investments. For example, a 
house represents the single largest asset owned by many individuals.  As such, the 
preceding analysis suggests the nascent market for reverse mortgages could provide large 
welfare gains for many individuals.  Whether the asset is a stock, bond or piece of
estate, the fundamental insight is individual portfolio decisions provide important clues 
to desirable annuity product innovations.  We next illustrate these ideas with two 
examples.  In the first example, we argue that investments providing constant
consumption should receive special attention since this likely makes up a sizeable
any individual portfolios.  In the second example, we analyze a 
representative utility specification to illustrate the quality of the welfare bounds. 
Example #1:  Welfare Bounds and Minimum Consumption 
Equation (20) suggests we focus our attention on any portfolio that is held, either in par
or in full, by a large number of people since reducing the cost of this portfolio yields 
widespread welfare gains.  Our utility framework identifies one such portfolio.  In ou
framework, starvation states are explicitly ruled out.  Hence, every optimal solution w
have a minimum positive consumption value (i.e., a consumption floor). While ou
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framework requires at least some wealth be allocated to minimum consumption, the 
fraction of wealth allocated could be arbitrarily small.  However, a review of the 
literature suggests wealth allocated to minimum consumption could actually be quite 
large.  For example, in traditional, time-separable utility models, high levels of minimum
consumption often result from intertemporal risk aversion or are explicitly imposed with 
a large subsistence requirement. More recently, habit formation models have developed
to explain the surprisingly high levels of consumption persistence. Constantinides (199
and Sundaresan (1989) pioneered this approach. In addition to the academic literature, 
consumption smoothing is also a ubiquitous theme in the financial planning literatur
Arguably, the most popular rule of thumb for retirement consumption is Bengen’s (199
4% rule. This rule pegs retirement spending to a real, constant value—4% of initial 
wealth. Bengen states that his clients “wanted to spend as much as possible each year 
from their retirement accounts, while maintaining a consistent lifestyle throughout 
retirement.”
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13  In short, there is substantial evidence that many investors want a sizea
floor—a constant, risk-free
pecifically lowers the cost of floor consumption will likely improve welfare 
across a broad population. 
We can estimate the welfare gain derived from using annuities to support floor 
consumption using an investor from our sample cohort. Initially, suppose that she inv
$100 in a zero-coupon bond ladder to provide her consumption floor. Table 2 reports her
savings for various annuity market enhancements (the columns) and money’s worth 
values (the rows). If all annuities are actuarially fair (K = 100%), then the savings is the 
same across all markets—the floor purchased for $100 can now be purchased for $69
a savings of $30.90. From equation (20), we see that our investor’s total welfare gain i
least $30.90.14 As the money’s worth decreases, early annuity payouts are no longer 
cheaper than early zero-coupon bond payouts. A longevity annuity selectively avoids 
 
13 See Scott, Sharpe and Watson (2008) for more detail on the financial planning literature and the 4% rule. 
14 In this literature, welfare gains are often reported in terms of Annuity Equivalent Wealth (AEW). AEW 
assumes an optimal utility is achieved with annuities and then calculates the additional wealth required to 
compensate for the loss of annuity access. This approach relies on optimizations in the enhanced market 
which does not allow a welfare calculation based on observable portfolios.  We avoid this problem by 
returning to the fundamental definition of welfare – equation (16).  There is generally not a translation from 
the reported welfare gain and AEW.  However, if the utility function is CRRA and separable, then AEW = 
$100 / ($100 – W).  Thus for a $30 welfare gain, AEW is $100/$70 ≈ $143. 
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these expensive annuity payouts, and in combination with bonds, it saves more mone
a floor than an immediate annuity. Delayed purchase annuities are superior to immedia
annuities, but inferior to longevity annuities. Further, the welfare gains of longev
annuities are robust to annuity market frictions, e.g., at the 70% money’s worth level, 
where the welfare gain from an immediate annuity is negligible, the gain from a 
longevity annuity still exceeds half of its actuarially fair level.  Enhancing the market 
further by providing zero-coupon annuities does not improve upon longevity annuitie
these cost l
y on 
te 
ity 
s at 
evels.  Money’s worth levels would have to dip below the age 85 survival 
probability (~63%) for zero-coupon annuities to provide a cheaper path to minimum 
spending. 
Money's Worth (K) Immediate
Delayed 
Purchase Longevity Zero-coupon
100% $30.9 $30.9 $30.9 $30.9
90% $23.3 $23.3 $25.4 $25.4
80% $13.7 $14.7 $21.4 $21.4
70% $1.3 $8.4 $18.0 $18.0
Notes : Access to th ies based on age 
65 female using GAM  purchase and 
Welfare Bound per $100 Allocation to Minimum Consumption
Annuity Market
Table 2
e finanical market alone is the base case in all situations.  Interest rates are 2%.  Survival probabilit
 94 mortality tables with adjustments to 2006.  The maximum age is assumed to be 100.  Delayed
longevity annuities have a maximum payout start age of 85 while zero-coupon annuity payouts are available up to age 100.  
Example #2:  Welfare Bounds and Habit Formation Utility 
We have presented two bounds on the welfare gain—the savings welfare bound and
floor welfare bound. The floor bound depends only on an investor’s floor consumption;
however, if we know all her portfolio’s payouts, we can calculate the welfare from 
savings and improve that bound. Finally, if we know an investor’s utility function, we 
 the 
 
can cal ctual 
welfare, and in this section, we illustrate their accuracy with a numerical experiment. 
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This habit formation utility was introduced by Diamond and Mirrlees (2000) and later 
analyzed by Davidoff et al. (2005). Note that consumption ct  at time t is independent of 
state, i.e., risk-free. In equation (21a), t is the cohort’s survival probability,  is a time-
discount parameter,  is a risk-aversion parameter, and t is the habit level. The habit 
level changes with time following equation (21b) and depends on its previous level, the 
previous consumption, and the habit persistence . For our numerical examples, we use  
= 2 and  = 1 (Davidoff’s values) and a real interest rate of  = 2%. We set the initial 
habit level 0 to $3.85, the floor level our cohort can purchase with a bond ladder.15 
In Figure 2, we plot two optimal consumption streams versus age for an investor 
with the above habit utility and parameters. The solid bar at age 65 corresponds to the 
initial habit level   = $3.850 . The first stream c (solid diamonds) is optimal for an initial 
endowment of $100 and when our investor has no access to annuities. The second stream 
c (empty squares) is optimal for an initial endowment of $75.3 and when our investor 
has access to a longevity annuity market with K = 80%. The endowment for c  was 
chosen so that the optimal utility for both streams is the same, i.e., U(c ) = U(c )  . Hence 
the endowment difference, $24.7, is the welfare gain from introducing the longevity 
annuity market.   
Figure 2
Optimal Consumption with Habit Formation
No Annuity vs. Longevity Annuity
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Initial habit (0 = 3.85) Welfare Gain     =  $24.7
Savings Bound  =  $20.9
Floor Bound      =  $17.7
 
                                                 
15 We use a bond-funded floor to fix the initial habit level, whereas Davidoff et al. (2005) used levels of 
0.5, 1.0 and 2.0 times an immediate annuity funded floor. We also investigated a range of values, and the 
results of those experiments are very similar to those reported here. 
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We also see that for this situation, the two welfare bounds provide a good 
estimate of total welfare.  The introduction of longevity annuities significantly changes 
the price of consumption across the various ages.  The result is fairly substantial shifts in 
consumption.  Consumption prior to age 84 declines on average by 12.5%.  Consumption 
at age 84 and beyond increases by an average of 31%.  Even with relatively large shifts in 
consumption, the welfare from savings is still a good bound for the total welfare gain.  
With longevity annuities, the original consumption stream can be replicated at a cost 
savings of $20.9, thus the welfare from savings captures about 85% of the total welfare 
gain. Prior to the introduction of longevity annuities, the minimum consumption level 
was $3.19.  The cost savings on this floor consumption was $17.7, capturing 
approximately 72% of the total welfare gain. 
Table 3 reports the welfare gain for four annuity markets (column groups) and 
various values of the money’s worth (rows). Welfare triplets are reported for each 
combination—actual welfare, savings welfare, and floor welfare. For all welfare 
calculations, an annuity market is considered as an enhancement over the financial 
market. For example, the actual, savings, and floor welfare gains for an actuarially fair 
(K = 100%) immediate annuity are $30.4, $28.4, and $25.6, respectively. Similarly, the 
triplet for the longevity annuity (K = 80%) is $24.7, $20.9, and $17.7—these values 
correspond to the consumption streams discussed above and plotted in Figure 2.  
Money's Worth (K) U Savings Floor U Savings Floor U Savings Floor U Savings Floor
100% 30.4 28.4 25.6 31.7 29.7 25.6 34.7 30.8 25.6 36.9 31.3 25.6
90% 22.6 21.2 19.3 24.1 22.0 19.3 29.2 25.2 21.1 31.7 25.8 21.1
80% 13.1 12.2 11.3 15.6 13.5 12.2 24.7 20.9 17.7 27.3 21.5 17.7
70% 1.2 1.1 1.1 8.8 7.2 6.9 20.6 17.2 14.9 23.2 17.9 14.9
Annuity Market
Notes :  Access to the financial market alone is the base case in all situations.  For each annuity regime / money's worth combination the welfare gain was calculated based on the 
utility function, U, described in the text. The welfare from savings bound (Savings) and the welfare bound based on minimum consumption (Floor) are also reported for each 
combination.  
Table 3
Welfare and Welfare Bounds with Habit Formation Utility
Immediate Delayed Purchase Longevity Zero-coupon
 
Consider the top row of Table 3—the row corresponding to actuarially fair 
markets. We see that as annuity markets become more flexible, moving from left to right 
on the chart, welfare increases.  For example, as we move from an immediate annuity 
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market to a longevity annuity market, welfare increases from $30.4 to $34.7. Moreover, 
the value of flexibility becomes more dramatic in the face of higher costs. For the 
money’s worth value K = 70%, as we move from an immediate annuity to a longevity 
annuity market the welfare increases from $1.2 to $20.6. Both welfare values decrease, as 
they must, but the percentage decrease of the longevity annuity is much less than that of 
the immediate annuity. 
The second value in each welfare triplet is the welfare from savings. The actual 
welfare is the sum of the welfares from savings and consumption shifting, and we 
observe that former dominates the latter. Across all annuity enhancements and all cost 
levels, the savings welfare captures at least three-quarters of the actual welfare, and often 
captures ninety percent or more.16 The welfare from shifting tends to be larger for 
longevity and zero-coupon annuity markets because these markets allow for more 
flexible spending patterns. The floor welfare, the third value in the triplet, is a bound on 
savings welfare.  The quality of this bound depends critically on the utility function 
selected and the resulting taste for floor consumption.  However, Table 3 does illustrate 
how, for this common class of utility specifications, welfare gains are reasonably well 
estimated by cost savings on floor consumption. 
6.  Completing the Annuity Market 
In the preceding sections, we assumed the annuity market was characterized by bundling 
and frictions and investigated the types of annuity market enhancements likely to 
improve participation and generate welfare gains.  In this section, we take a different 
approach.  Here, we consider the types of annuity products demanded when annuity 
markets are complete.  Characterizing annuity products that people want given access to a 
complete market could identify desirable annuity packages that effectively substitute for 
a complete market.  To give an extreme example, suppose, when given access to infinite 
choice in the annuity market, everyone decides they want the same exact bundle of 
annuity payouts.  This would be good news indeed for annuity providers.  Instead of 
having to go to the expense of creating every possible annuity package, they need only 
                                                 
16 While not reported in the text, this result held true across a variety of habit utility specifications. 
Additional data are available from the authors upon request. 
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create a single package.  Access to that single package would provide all the benefits of a 
complete market. 
To investigate this possibility, we assume our annuity market is complete in the 
sense that every state has an available survival-contingent asset.  However, our annuity 
market is not frictionless.  Annuity prices are described by equation (6).  Since each state 
has a financial and an annuity asset available, we can define a state-specific spending 
improvement quotient, q(s).  Equation (6) and the definition of q imply:   
s
ssKsq 
)()22(  
Financial and Annuity Market Separation Theorem 
When an annuity market is incomplete, only specific annuity packages are 
available. In this case, costs are not the sole factor, and suitability depends on whether a 
package’s payouts complement an investor’s desired payouts. However, when an annuity 
market is complete, we can say a good deal about which annuities are purchased, 
independent of an investor’s utility function.  In particular, for both a rational and 
behavioral investor, there will exist a critical q that separates financial and annuity 
market purchases.  Here, an optimal investment plan will only purchase financial assets 
in the states s  with a spending-improvement level q(s) less than q and only annuity 
assets in all states with a q(s) greater than the same q (see the Appendix for a 
demonstration of this result). We call this result the Separation Theorem for complete 
annuity markets.17 Informally, annuities are purchased exclusively in high q states, 
whereas financial assets are exclusively purchased in low q states.  
For a purely rational investor, q  equals zero.  In other words, in any state where 
the money’s worth exceeds the survival probability the investor will rely on annuity 
assets for consumption.  Similarly, in any state with a negative q the investor relies solely 
on financial market assets.  This recovers Yaari’s result of full annuitization since 
actuarially fair pricing implies all values of q are at least non-negative.  It extends Yaari’s 
analysis by describing the solution for complete annuity markets with frictions.  Now, 
                                                 
17 This generalizes the separation results presented in Scott et al. 2007 
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only states which offer a discount in the annuity market are supported with annuity 
investments.  The result for a behavioral investor with a distaste of annuities is similar 
except now q >0.   
The Separation Theorem has significant implications for the annuity market.  In 
general, optimal annuity bundles should never have payouts that occur in states with a 
survival probability too high to cover the costs of creating the annuity contract.  For 
example, suppose an annuity market is characterized by a money’s worth percentage of 
85%.  For our sample cohort, survival rates don’t drop below 85% until age 77.  Given 
access to a complete market, our investor would fund all consumption between the ages 
of 65 and 76 with financial market securities and all later life consumption with annuity 
market assets.  In addition, if her preferences include a distaste for annuity investments, 
then the critical age would be even older.   
The package of annuity products that all individuals want when markets are 
complete all share one common property.  They all create sufficient time between the 
purchase date and the payout date to allow the survival discount to overcome any annuity 
costs.  Surprisingly, this property characterizes few existing annuity products.  With the 
exception of the recently-introduced longevity annuity, annuity packages uniformly 
include payouts with little to no potential for a survival discount.  The alignment of the 
longevity annuity payouts with those desired given a complete market provide an 
important insight into why longevity annuities are a significant annuity market 
enhancement with the potential to increase participation and create welfare gains. 
Conclusion  
The disparity between economic prediction and observed annuity market demand has 
been well documented.  However, the disparity between ideal and actual annuity markets 
is equally large.  The difficulty associated with writing and monitoring a survival-
contingent contract suggests annuity markets will never offer actuarially fair pricing nor 
will they likely approach financial markets in terms of flexibility.  Given this reality, 
what types of annuity product innovations might close the gap between current and ideal 
annuity markets?  In short, what makes a better annuity? 
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To answer this question, we must first identify the goal of annuity market 
innovation.  We considered the annuity market implications of two separate objectives: 
increased participation and improved individual welfare.  With increased participation as 
the objective, we suggested insurance companies focus on maximizing the spending 
improvement quotient, q.  We demonstrated that annuity product introductions that do not 
alter the maximum q cannot influence participation.  Similarly, introductions that 
significantly increase the maximum q could spur large increases in participation.  While q 
is related to both mortality and costs, the most promising area for large increases in q is 
not lowering annuity costs, but rather offering annuity products focused on late-life 
payouts.   
If our objective instead is to increase welfare, we suggested insurance companies 
pay close attention to the assets held by their potential customers.  These assets offer 
important clues as to the types of payouts these individuals find desirable.  In fact, the 
extent to which an annuity product innovation helps individuals replicate their existing 
portfolio payouts at a lower cost often provides a good estimate for total welfare gains.  
Thus, innovation focused on minimizing the cost of existing asset allocations likely 
garners a significant fraction of the potential welfare gain. 
Finally, we considered which annuity packages are essential to ultimately 
completing the annuity market.  Given complete annuity markets, annuity purchases 
should only occur when the mortality discount is sufficient to overcome any annuity 
costs.  With positive costs, an annuity purchase thus requires a gap between the purchase 
date and the payout date.  Surprisingly, the vast majority of annuity products available 
today bundle at least some payouts without a gap.  This fundamental inefficiency 
suggests innovative new products may ultimately supplant many incumbent annuity 
products.  While annuity demand is low, our research suggests that existing annuity 
markets offer ample opportunities for improvement.  Hopefully, annuity innovations 
based on the guidelines identified in this research will ultimately result in the types of 
participation and welfare benefits Yaari identified over four decades ago. 
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Appendix 
Rational investors will maximize their utility and choose the consumption stream given 
by the mathematical program described by equations (12). In this appendix, we consider 
the more general utility function V(c,) which depends on the consumption stream c(s) 
for s   and allows for a potential dependency on the amount  invested in annuities. 
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Here, the decision variables are c(s) and x(s) for s  , y(a) for a  A, and . The 
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions (Luenberger 1995, eqs. C.4, 460-1) for this program 
simplify to the following set of equations: 
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We assume that V is concave and that these conditions are both necessary and sufficient 
for a maximum. Further, we assume that the budget constraint, equation (A2c), is binding 
and that its Lagrange multiplier  is positive. 
We use equations (A2) to demonstrate a number of useful theorems. Before 
proceeding, we derive an alternative form of equation (A2f) that we use extensively in 
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these proofs. If we eliminate the partial derivates Vs from equation (A2f) using equation 
(A2d), we obtain: 
 
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In the above equation, we have introduced the parameter q(a), an annuity’s spending-
improvement quotient: 
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The price G is the price of replicating the annuity’s payouts with financial assets. Also 
in equation (A3a), we have introduced P, the penalty for purchasing annuities: 
**** /),()3(  cVPdA    
Since we assume that utility decreases as the wealth invested in annuities increases, the 
penalty P is positive for behavioral investors. For purely rational investors, this 
parameter is zero. 
Theorem: The spending-improvement quotient of any purchased annuity must be greater 
than or equal to the behavioral penalty, a non-negative number. 
Proof: Suppose that y(a) > 0 for some annuity a  A. It follows from the complimentary 
slackness condition equation (A2g) that (a) is zero, and hence the right side of equation 
(A3a) is zero:  
  


s
aa sGsPaqaA )()()()4( *   
We have (s)  0 by equation (A2e), and since Ga(s)  0, the right side of the above 
equation is non-negative. Further, since  is positive, we must have q(a)  P. QED 
Corollary: If an annuity is purchased, then its price is no greater than the price of the 
bundle of financial assets that replicates its payouts. 
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Proof: From the previous theorem, the spending-improvement quotient q(a) must be non-
negative. It follows from its definition that if q  0, then G    a. QED     
Theorem: If the spending-improvement quotient of any annuity is greater than the 
behavioral penalty, then at least one annuity product is purchased. 
Proof: For any annuity product a, the Lagrange multiplier for its no short-sale constraint 
must be non-negative, i.e., (a)  0. Using equation (A3a), we get the following 
inequality for every a  A: 
 
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If for some annuity a, its quotient q(a) exceeds P, then the sum on the left side of 
equation (A5a) is strictly positive. Hence, there must be at least one state s  where 
both Ga(s) and (s) are simultaneously greater than zero. However, if (s) > 0, then it 
follows from equation (A2e) that x(s) = 0. We know from our no-starvation assumption 
that every state must receive either a financial or annuity payout. Since the payout in state 
s is not financial, it must be from an annuity, say a. Though a and a are not necessarily 
the same annuity, they will have at least one payout state in common. QED 
Corollary: For non-behavioral investors, if the price of any annuity is strictly less than 
the price of the bundle of financial assets that replicates its payouts, then at least one 
annuity product is purchased. 
This theorem follows from the previous theorem when P is zero. QED 
Separation Theorem: When the annuity market is complete, annuity state-claims are 
purchased on the states for which q(s) >P, and financial state claims are purchased on 
the states for which q(s) < P. 
Proof: For a complete annuity market, we have an annuity state-claim corresponding to 
each financial state-claim, i.e., A  S. Further, for each annuity state-claim a, the payout 
function Ga(s) equals one when s equals a, and equals zero otherwise. The sum in 
equation (A3a) simplifies, and the equation reduces to: 
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When q(s) exceeds P, (s) must be positive, and from equation (A2e), it follows that 
x(s) = 0, i.e., no financial state-claims are purchased. Since we do not allow starvation 
states, we must have y(s) > 0. Similarly, we can show that q(s) < P, implies x(s) > 0
and y
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x(s) > 0 and (s) = 0 for all s  . In this case, the marginal utility at y = 0 simplifies is: 
(s) = 0. QED 
Theorem: For an investor with all her wealth in financial assets, the marginal utility of 
switching money out of financial assets and into annuity assets is proportional to Q –P, 
where Q is the market’s spending-improvement quotient and P is her behavioral 
penalty. 
An investor who chooses not to purchase annuities will solve equations (A1), but wit
no-short constraints (y  0) changed to no-purchase constraints (y = 0). In this case, 
equations (A2) remain valid, except that we drop the non-negativity constraints on the 
Lagrange multipliers —they now can have either sign. If we were to relax one of the n
purchase constraints, then the marginal increase in maximum utility for an increase in
shares of this annuity is proportional to the constraint’s multiplier, i.e., dV/dy = -, 
where  is given by equation (A3a). Note that if  is positive, then there is no advantage 
to purchasing this annuity. Since all consumption is funded with financial assets, we have
 **0* ay
Alternatively, we can compute the marginal utility of investing an amount  in this
)(/)7( PaqdydVaA    
 same 
nnuity, and since the investment equals the product of shares and price, we have: a
  **0* )(/)7( PaqddVbA   
Equations (A7) are valid for relaxing the no-purchase constraint on any one annuity, 
while enforcing it on all the remaining products. If we simultaneously open the conte
all annuities, the product(s) with the 
 
st to 
largest q will win the investment, and so for an 
unrestricted investment , we have: 
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In equations (A8), the market’s spending-improvement quotient Q is the largest quotient 
of any of its products. QED 
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